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Dreaming of a Universal Biology:  
Synthetic Biology and the Origins of Life 
Massimiliano Simons 
Abstract: Synthetic biology aims to synthesize novel biological systems or re-
design existing ones. The field has raised numerous philosophical questions, 
but most especially what is novel to this field. In this article I argue for a novel 
take, since the dominant ways to understand synthetic biology’s specificity 
each face problems. Inspired by the examination of the work of a number of 
chemists, I argue that synthetic biology differentiates itself by a new regime of 
articulation, i.e. a new way of articulating the questions and phenomena it 
wants to address. Instead of describing actual existing biological systems, the 
field aims to describe biological possibilities. In the second part I corroborate 
this hypothesis through a comparison between early research in the field of 
the origins of life and contemporary synthetic biologists, who are not so much 
interested in the historical origin of life on Earth, but rather in a universal bi-
ology of the possible origins of any life whatsoever. 
Keywords: synthetic biology, universal biology, origins of life, biological possibili-
ties. 
1. Introduction 
Synthetic biology is one of the most recent developments within the life sci-
ences. The field has many birthdates, but as an institutionalized field it was 
launched in the early 2000s and stabilized around 2010 (Raimbault, Cointet 
& Joly 2016). Typically, the field is defined as the application of engineering 
to biology in order to (re)design biological systems. Historically, it has 
drawn inspiration either from engineering or from synthetic chemistry (see 
Campos 2009, Bensaude-Vincent 2013). 
 According to some scholars, synthetic biology raises new philosophical 
questions, mainly by its new method of synthesis. This is not only argued for 
by philosophers (e.g. Malaterre 2013), but also by a number of synthetic bi-
ologists, who similarly claim that “synthesis as a research strategy can drive 
discovery and paradigm shift in ways that observation and analysis cannot” 
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(Benner et al. 2010, p. 374). Others are not convinced that synthetic biology 
raises new philosophical questions. Humans have always shaped and designed 
their biological environment. What are cows and corn but artificial construc-
tions, produced by human intervention? Synthetic biology might claim to 
intervene in nature in novel manners, but even this can be doubted (O’Malley 
2009, Lewens 2013). 
 Much thus depends on three questions: (a) does synthetic biology implies 
something new? (b) if so, in what way? (c) and finally, what is philosophical-
ly at stake? I will argue that (a) there is something specific to synthetic biol-
ogy; (b) that what this is differs from the dominant narratives about synthet-
ic biology, and (c) that this deserves philosophical attention, since it raises 
novel philosophical questions. 
 The dominant narratives will be described in Section 2, followed by why I 
believe they are inapt. I will propose an alternative interpretation of the speci-
ficity of synthetic biology, namely that it resides in what I will call its regime 
of articulation: the way it articulates questions about living systems. My cen-
tral claim is that synthetic biology is characterized by a focus, not on describ-
ing actual existing living systems, but on describing possible living systems. I 
will defend this claim in three forms. The weak claim is that there are (at 
least) two ways of describing relevant phenomena in the life sciences, either 
focusing on actual or on possible living systems. The moderate claim is that 
within synthetic biology the latter is dominant. The strong claim is that this 
shift is a product neither of a natural progress nor of a theoretical choice. Ra-
ther it is linked to a shift in the experimental system (Rheinberger 1997), 
more particularly in its engagement with experimental objects such as proto-
cells or minimal cells. 
 Although my hypothesis is that this can be defended for most parts of 
synthetic biology, in this paper I will mainly defend it for chemical protocell 
synthesis. I will argue for this by contrasting earlier examples of biologists 
and chemists working on the origins of life, more particularly the work of 
Stanley Miller and J.D. Bernal (Section 3), with recent synthetic biology 
groups, such as the group of Stephen Mann and of Pier Luigi Luisi (Section 
4). At the end of Section 4 and in the conclusion I will draw some philosoph-
ical implications from this novel perspective on synthetic biology. 
2. What is Particular to Synthetic Biology? 
The specificity of synthetic biology has been described in many ways. I fol-
low Schmidt’s (2015) suggestion and cluster them in three dominant narra-
tives. Either the novelty of synthetic biology resides in the fact that it applies 
 Synthetic Biology and the Origins of Life 93 
 
engineering principles to the life sciences (Endy 2005, Képès 2011). Let us 
call this the engineering narrative. Or, what is novel is that the field is work-
ing with artificial biological systems, which are not found in nature (Benner 
et al. 2010). Let us call this the artificiality narrative. Finally, a third narrative 
states that synthetic biology is actually not something new, but a radicaliza-
tion of existing biotechnology (O’Malley 2009, Lewens 2013). This I will call 
the biotech narrative. Similar to Schmidt, my claim is that all three narratives 
fail to properly delineate the specificity of synthetic biology. 
2.1 Problems with dominant narratives 
What is wrong with the engineering narrative is threefold. First of all, it is an 
open question whether synthetic biology is really applying engineering prin-
ciples to biology. Some have argued that there is a discrepancy between what 
synthetic biologists say and what they do: they speak about rational princi-
ples, but in practice their work resembles tinkering and kludging (O’Malley 
2009, Calvert 2013). Secondly, historians have pointed out how engineering 
and biology have met before in history, often indeed linked with the dream 
to control and create novel living systems (Pauly 1987, Campos 2009). Such 
attempts were moreover not restricted to microbiology, but engineering has 
also had its influence in agriculture, plant science, and pharmacology (Curry 
2016, Crowe 2019). Thirdly, there is a strong diversity in conceptions of en-
gineering at work in these debates, which begs the question which engineer-
ing is applied to biology (Simons 2020a). 
 The artificiality narrative faces similar problems. For instance, one could 
argue that synthetic biology hardly deals with genuine artificial systems. 
Most, if not all, biological systems synthetic biologists work with are derived 
from nature. A telling example is that of Craig J. Venter’s famous announce-
ment to have created the first ‘artificial cell’ (Gibson et al. 2010). This claim 
was immediately criticized since only the genome was synthesized in a lab 
(and most of it was copied from an existing cell). The machinery of the cell 
(the organelles, the membrane, etc.) was simply taken over from an existing 
natural cell (see Simons, forthcoming). One could still argue, however, that 
synthetic biology combines existing, natural systems in ways they never oc-
cur in nature, and are therefore artificial (Benner et al. 2010). The problem is 
that this kind of artificiality is hardly novel in the life sciences. Also tradi-
tional breeding methods produce artificial living systems not found in nature 
(Lewens 2013). Such artificiality is even more striking in 20th century experi-
mental biology, for instance in cell cultures (Landecker 2009) or purified 
DNA (Barnes & Dupré 2008). 
 The failure of these two narratives have let some to argue that synthetic 
biology is nothing new, but merely a continuation of earlier biotechnologies 
94 Massimiliano Simons 
 
(Lewens 2013). However, the problem with this third narrative is that it 
makes us incapable to detect new philosophical issues raised by synthetic bi-
ology. This is the main concern of Evelyn Fox Keller, who worries that 
though biology never just describes (‘sees’) but also always intervenes in 
(‘touches’) its objects, maybe 
the pendulum has swung too far. While there may be – arguably, even can be – 
no looking without touching, it does not follow that looking and touching are 
the same. […] It erases distinctions between a variety of conceptual aims that 
may not sort by old boundaries but may still sort in ways that need marking. 
Perhaps nowhere does my unease surface more clearly than in thinking about 
the new interdiscipline of synthetic biology. [Keller 2009, p. 294]  
Similarly, Schmidt argues that the biotech narrative “prevents an exhaustive 
characterization of the new technoscientific wave” (Schmidt 2015, p. 7). Syn-
thetic biology is highly interdisciplinary and shares many characteristics with 
related technoscientific fields such as nanotechnology and robotics (Simons 
2020b). These links must be accounted for. Therefore, I wish to propose a 
candidate to characterize synthetic biology which is able to acknowledge pre-
vious elements of engineering and artificiality, while also situate its novelty 
within this new technoscientific wave.1 
2.2 A shift in its regime of articulation 
What I want to argue for is that synthetic biology is characterized by a shift 
in what I would like to call its regime of articulation. ‘Articulation’ is here 
used in a technical way, mainly inspired by constructivist philosophies of sci-
ence. Following suggestions by Latour (2004), Despret (2002), and Rouse 
(2015), a regime of articulation refers to the way in which a scientific practice 
theoretically and technically shapes the kind of questions it finds meaningful 
to ask and answer. As Rouse suggests, articulation is not a matter of correct-
ing earlier mistakes, but replaces a “silence rather than error” (Rouse 2015, p. 
208): 
In many scientific domains […] earlier generations of scientists could not have 
erred because the relevant errors were not yet even conceivable. In the most 
striking cases, scientists’ predecessors either had no basis whatsoever for mak-
ing claims within a domain or could only make vague, unarticulated claims. 
[Rouse 2015, p. 294] 
My hypothesis is that synthetic biology is characterized by a shift from artic-
ulating the actual to articulating the possible, i.e. synthetic biologists are more 
interested in exploring what living systems possibly could do rather than 
what they actually do. Whereas earlier biologists were not interested, dis-
missive, or simply silent about questions concerning biological possibilities, 
within a field such as synthetic biology these questions have become central. 
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 Such a shift has already been sporadically noted by commentators. Michel 
Morange, for instance, highlights how synthetic biology is translating histor-
ical questions of evolutionary biology (‘How has life evolved’?) into experi-
mental questions, due to new technologies and approaches. According to 
him, “synthetic biology can help evolutionary biologists explore possibilities 
that have not been realized by existing organisms” (Morange 2009, p. S53). In 
a similar vein, Malaterre argues that  
What appears to be distinctive of synthetic biology’s route to knowledge is 
that it broadens the perimeter of systems that can be manipulated beyond 
those that are naturally-occurring, and that it does so in an empirical space of 
biochemical possibilities that is truly large and so scarcely sampled by nature. 
[Malaterre 2013, p. 355] 
Similar remarks are found in the work of synthetic biologists themselves. In a 
paper in Nature, Michael Elowitz and Wendell Lim similarly argue that the 
discipline of biology is expanding “from a discipline that focuses on natural 
organisms to one that includes potential organisms” (Elowitz & Lim 2010, p. 
889). 
 Elowitz and Lim are part of the engineering strand of synthetic biology. I 
want to focus, however, on contributions by chemists to synthetic biology, 
since I believe that they illustrate this shift even clearer. A good illustration 
of this is Steve Benner (Benner et al., p. 2010; see Koskinen 2017). Benner has 
been studying ‘alternative genetic systems’ since the 1980s as a chemist. His 
work deals with artificial chemical structures that have the same functions as 
our familiar DNA and RNA molecules, but start from a fundamentally dif-
ferent design. Benner aims, for instance, to evaluate the Watson-Crick model 
of natural DNA: how necessary are the structural aspects of the bases and the 
sugar-phosphate backbones? Is it possible to replace the backbone with a dif-
ferent sugar (resulting in a form of XNA)? 
 According to Koskinen what is fundamentally at work here is the use of 
what he calls ‘how-possibly models’ (Koskinen 2017, p. 493). Synthetic biol-
ogists such as Benner are not interested in actual biological systems, but  
use how-possibly models to study what may be called potential biological sys-
tems. I argue that in the hands of bioengineers, how-possibly models are not 
just speculations or eliminable scaffolds towards one how-actually model, but 
rather design hypotheses for a field whose ultimate goal is to build novel biolog-
ical systems and ‘re-wire’ existing ones. Apart from their more traditional ex-
planatory purpose, how-possibly models can function as ways of studying, and 
ultimately concretizing, biological possibilia. [Koskinen 2017, p. 494] 
Similarly, I have argued elsewhere that the work on minimal genomes can be 
interpreted in a similar way, in the sense that biologists such as Craig Venter 
are mainly interested in possible minimal life, rather than actual existing min-
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imal living systems (Simons 2020b). From this literature, the hypothesis 
comes forward that synthetic biology tends to articulate its phenomena in a 
different and novel manner, since they are ultimately interested in biological 
possibilia. These possibilities are moreover metaphysical possibilities, rather 
than, for instance, studying epistemic possibilities. 
 My paper wants to expands and supports this hypothesis further through 
the novel case of protocell biology. Protocell biology is a rather small sub-
field of synthetic biology (Raimbault, Cointet & Joly 2016). Nonetheless, it 
deserves our attention for at least three reasons. First of all, it can bring liter-
ature on synthetic biology into contact with that of the origins of life and 
astrobiology. These interactions are currently absent, despite that fact that 
they overlap concerning topics about possible forms of life. Secondly, it can 
correct an overemphasis among commentators on the engineering subfields 
of synthetic biology. Thirdly, it can therefore shed light on the enigma of 
how synthetic biology can consist of what at first sight looks like a strange 
alliance between engineers and chemists. These chemists, just as the engi-
neers in the above examples, share an interest in studying possible forms of 
life.  
 For these reasons I will, in the next session, focus on how protocell biol-
ogy should be situated in relation to the field of the origins of life. First (in 
Section 3) I will describe how the question of the origins of life was concep-
tualized in the middle of the 20th century, by authors such as Stanley Miller 
and J. D. Bernal. In Section 4, I will contrast this with two contemporary ex-
amples, namely the Mann group and the Luisi group. As stated before, I wish 
to argue for three theses: (a) that there are two regimes of articulation at 
work here; (b) that within synthetic biology only one of them is dominant; 
and (c) that the reason for this resides in shifting experimental practices, al-
lowing synthetic biologists to engage with novel experimental objects, such 
as minimal cells and protocells. 
3. Articulating the Actual Origins of Life 
My aim is to juxtapose two episodes in the origin of life research, namely re-
search at the heights of molecular biology (1950s) and more recent research 
that is aligned with synthetic biology (2000s). My claim is not that my argu-
ment is applicable to the whole field of the origins of life. Here I will only 
focus on synthetic biology. I therefore leave out other work on the origins of 
life, such as the work of Leslie Orgel, Timor Gnati, Manfred Eigen, or Stuart 
Kaufman (see Kauffman 2011). I thus do not claim that the historical ques-
tion of the origins of life has disappeared completely nor that the question of 
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the possible origins of life was never posed before synthetic biology entered 
the scene. Rather I juxtapose these two groups to highlight how there are (at 
least) two ways how to pursue the question of the origins of life, and how in 
synthetic biology the question is different from how it was understood by 
earlier influential authors. 
3.1 Miller, Bernal, and the actual origin of life 
The most famous experiment linked with the question of the origin of life is 
probably the 1953 Miller-Urey experiment, conducted by Stanley Miller un-
der supervision of Harold Urey, which showed that under certain conditions 
complex amino acids can spontaneously be formed out of simpler chemicals 
(Miller 1953). However, this experiment was certainly not the start of the 
field, but must be situated in a longer tradition. 
 What it shared with its immediate predecessors was the way in which the 
problem of the origin of life was understood or, in my technical term, articu-
lated. An influential author was the Russian biochemist Alexander Oparin, 
who in 1924 proposed a theory in which life on Earth could be explained as a 
product of a chemical evolution, following a number of simple steps (a varia-
tion on the famous ‘primordial soup’ theory). A few years later, the British 
biologist J.B.S. Haldane published a similar hypothesis, with the result that 
this position is known as the Oparin-Haldane hypothesis (Falk & Lazcano 
2012, Tirard 2017). 
 In order to understand Stanley Miller, it is thus important to appreciate 
what was at stake for Oparin and Haldane. Their specific framing of the 
question of the origin of life came out of a (perceived) clash between the 
work of Louis Pasteur and Charles Darwin. Through a range of experiments, 
Pasteur discredited the theory of spontaneous generation, which claimed that 
life could spontaneously arise out of non-living materials, such as maggots 
from rotting meat. Pasteur demonstrated that living beings could only arise 
out of other living beings. On the other hand, Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection suggested that there must have been an ‘origin of species’. But sub-
sequent discoveries, showing the complexities of even a single cell, seemed to 
show that an “impassable abyss existed between the living and the dead” 
(Oparin 1924, p. 203). This conflict made neo-vitalistic theory, such as in 
Hans Driesch’s work, or the theory of panspermia, according to which life 
has been eternally present in the universe, gain popularity. Authors such as 
Oparin or Haldane wanted to offer an alternative both to vitalism and to a 
very strict kind of continuous materialism. According to them there was ma-
terial novelty through a range of small jumps.2  
 The same kind of framing is found in Miller’s work. For instance, he 
starts a later article, written together with Urey, as follows: 
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Since the demonstration by Pasteur that life does not arise spontaneously at 
the present time, the problem of the origin of life has been one of determining 
how the first forms of life arose, from which all the present species have 
evolved. [Miller & Urey 1959, p. 245] 
Miller is concerned with the problem of uncovering the organic compounds 
and steps required to end up with living organisms. The bulk of his papers is 
therefore concerned with identifying the exact historical conditions on Earth 
when life came into being (e.g. whether there were oceans, whether oxygen 
was present, etc.). Miller does discuss the possibility of life on other planets, 
but in the form of the question whether the right chemicals, temperature, etc. 
are present on other planets as well.  
 It is thus important to realize that his work is concerned with experimen-
tally articulating and investigating the original historical conditions of Earth 
in order to show that life can spontaneously arise. If alien life forms were to 
be discovered, this would be “one of the most marvelous feats of 20th-
century science,” but only because as a consequence, “the thesis that life de-
velops spontaneously when the conditions are favorable would be far more 
firmly established and our whole view of the problem of the origin of life 
would be confirmed” (Miller & Urey 1959, p. 251). That this life might have 
a fundamentally different chemistry is rarely considered, and even in the rare 
cases that it is, not seen as a relevant possibility. Such a question was raised 
by Enrico Fermi (from the Fermi paradox) in one of Miller and Urey’s semi-
nars, but the answer was brief and telling. When Fermi asked, “I understand 
that you and Miller have demonstrated one path by which life might have 
originated. Harold, do you think it was the way?” Urey replied, “Let me put 
it this way, Enrico. If God didn’t do it this way, he overlooked a good bet!” 
(quoted in Lazcano & Bada 2008, p. 376). 
3.2 The importance of molecular biology 
Besides the question of spontaneous generation, another issue was also at 
play and became more dominant with the rise of a new player in the field: 
molecular biology. What became important was a tension between diverse 
accounts of the origin of life which crystallized in two opposing viewpoints, 
namely  
those who favor the idea that life is an emergent interactive system endowed 
with dynamic properties that exist in a state close to chaotic behavior, and 
those who are reluctant to adhere to a definition of living systems lacking a 
genetic component whose properties reflect the role that Darwinian natural 
selection and, in general, evolutionary processes, have played in shaping its 
central characteristics. [Falk & Lazcano 2012, p. 387]  
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Due to the dominance of molecular biology, the second, genetic viewpoint 
prevailed. Through the subsequent realization that cells and even bacterio-
phages were complex beings on their own, in need of both processes of me-
tabolism and replication, the question became how a form of life could come 
into being that possessed both DNA and proteins. It seemed that one of 
them needed to come first, leading eventually to the popular ‘RNA world’ 
hypothesis: in this first stage of evolutionary history there was only RNA, 
possessing both genetic material and catalytic properties. 
 Molecular biology gained momentum in the 1960s, but so was the study 
of the origin of life. The first international conferences took place in 1957 
(Moscow) and 1963 (Florida). A clear case where the study of the origin of 
life and molecular biology merged was the work of J.D. Bernal, who also 
translated the work of Oparin into English. In The Origin of Life (1967), 
Bernal starts from the idea that origin of life research “is a speculative science 
and not by any means observational or experimental science, although obser-
vation and experiment are used in its study” (Bernal 1967, p. 3). It is thus 
“necessarily a work of imagination, but of imagination controlled by science” 
(ibid., p. 5). The reason for this is the fundamental nature of the phenomena 
that are to be articulated and explained by this research. The book is con-
cerned with life as it exists on Earth. It is “an attempt to produce a plausible 
history of the origins of these chemical-physical processes on the actual 
Earth surface” (ibid., p. 7). Rather than a question of synthesis, of exploring 
possibilities, it is a “process of the logical reconstruction of the earlier forms 
of life” (ibid., p. 2). 
 But why is Bernal interested in the origin of life? What seemed to be at 
stake is a new issue raised by molecular biology, which offers us the “basis for 
the development of a new generalized biology, not depending on the peculiar 
forms existing on Earth” (ibid., p. xv-xvi). At first, this might look very simi-
lar to the universal biology propagated by synthetic biology (as we will see), 
but it is in fact radically different. Bernal is interested in a specific universality 
of life, but different from the one at work in contemporary synthetic biolo-
gy: he is not concerned with the question of a chemical universality of life, 
but rather a genetic-biological universality.  
 Molecular biology has shown that all life-forms, no matter their evolu-
tionary contingencies, share DNA. It is thus a matter of “recognizing the 
unity of life on Earth” (ibid., p. 4), but only as opposed to the evolutionary 
and development contingencies that distinguish an elephant from a giraffe. 
Both might look different, even have different genes, but the fact that both 
have genes and share DNA is what is universal. If the question is raised 
whether there would be life on other planets, it is a question concerning 
whether life chemically similar to that on Earth would exist there: “We may yet 
find on other planets, schemes of life which are different, but probably only 
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in the detail of their chemical reactions, not in the essentials of the types of 
process or in their chemical elements that are involved in them” (ibid., p. 
161). 
 There is thus an eye for contingency, but framed through the lens of a 
particular regime of articulation: life is a historical phenomenon which starts 
from the same fundamental principles, but evolution and natural selection 
can create all kinds of surprises. The question of whether the chemistry is 
contingent in any sense is not raised or dismissed as an irrelevant and specu-
lative question. It only appears in the margins, namely at the end of chapters 
or in question sections. For instance, at a certain moment, Bernal wonders 
“whether the processes required in the origin of life are necessary or contin-
gent” and he answers as follows: 
Both explanations must be true in some measure, first, because any structures 
widely different from those of minimal energy would be unstable and unlikely 
to have a long life and, secondly, because there is not only one form of life but 
a wide multiplicity of forms. These may vary widely in small matters, but not 
in basic biochemistry. [Ibid. p. 34] 
Similarly, in appendix 4, which reproduces a questions-and-answers session 
of a conference paper ‘Molecular Matrices for Living Systems’ from 1963: 
Q1: Is life necessary or contingent? A: The simpler [forms] are and the more 
complicated are not. Molecules such as adenine are apparently necessary. The 
forms of any particular organism is not. It is contingent on the accidents of 
organic evolution. [Ibid. p. 299] 
Q31: Is life on Earth a fair sample of life types on any hydrosphere? A: Proba-
bly. (Ibid., p. 302] 
Bernal is thus quite explicit in his claim of chemical necessity and evolution-
ary contingency. The question of the origin of life is one of finding out what 
the actual historical chemical steps were of life on Earth, which can be logi-
cally reconstructed through a speculative endeavor because they seem to be 
logical necessary. If there is contingency, it seems to be only at work on the 
level of evolutionary history. Chemical contingency is not considered to be 
relevant. 
4. Articulating the Possible Origin of Life 
Let me contrast this with recent research by synthetic biologists, which start 
from a radically different regime of articulation. My story starts in 2003, with 
“two back-to-back workshops – one held jointly at Los Alamos National La-
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boratory (LANL) and the Santa Fe Institute (SFI), the other in Dortmund, 
Germany, at the Seventh European Conference on Artificial Life” (Rasmus-
sen et al. 2004, p. 963). Both workshops aim to study the transition from 
nonliving to living matter, which “is usually raised in the context of the 
origin of life”. These workshops, however, aimed to take  
a broader view and asked how simple life forms could be synthesized in the la-
boratory. The resulting artificial cells (sometimes called protocells) might be 
quite different from any extant or extinct form of life, perhaps orders of mag-
nitude smaller than the smallest bacterium, and their synthesis need not reca-
pitulate life’s actual origins. [Rasmussen et al. 2004, p. 963] 
It is thus concerned with a similar problem as before, but its approach is dif-
ferent. We encounter here the specific subdiscipline of synthetic biology, 
namely “protocell biology” (Mann 2013) or “protocell systems biology” 
(Solé, Rasmussen & Bedau 2007), which “aims at the construction of a chem-
ical life-like ensemble in the form of an artificial cell system able to self-
maintain, self-reproduce and potentially evolve” (Solé et al. 2007, p. 1727). 
To study these processes, they focus on objects called ‘protocells’, often de-
fined as “the simplest instances of autonomous cell-like structures” (Solé, 
Rasmussen & Bedau 2007, p. 1725). As a concept, ‘protocell’ dates back to 
the 1960s, but in the early decades it was mainly discussed in theoretical 
journals, such as BioSystems and Journal of Theoretical Biology. Only at the 
turn of the century, when new fields like synthetic biology came into being, 
did “protocell models enter the laboratory” (Dzieciol & Mann 2011). 
 The result of this transformation of protocell research is a reinvestment of 
these authors in the investigation of the origin of life, for which they believe 
they can offer experimental means to answers its questions. Simultaneously it 
implies a number of significant shifts in comparison with earlier origin of life 
research. First of all, the definition of the essence of life shifts from the ge-
netic variant to the more systematic variant: life is defined not by a certain 
molecule or by DNA, but by a range of abstract criteria. Rasmussen and col-
leagues, for instance, argue that in order for a protocell to be alive, it must 
(1) use free energy to convert resources from the environment into building 
blocks so that it can grow and eventually divide. (2) have the growth and divi-
sion processes at least partly controlled by inheritable information. (3) allow 
the inheritable information to change slightly from one generation to the next, 
thereby permitting variation of the growth and division processes and thus al-
lowing selection and hence evolution. [Rasmussen et al. 2013, p. 585] 
Secondly, this results in a shift in focus from actual life on Earth to possible 
forms of life, “the problem of defining life, not only as we know it, but as it 
could exist or might exist on other planets, or even as it might at some future 
time by synthesized in a terrestrial lab” (Ruiz-Mirazo & Moreno 2011, p. 3). 
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Such a definition, they add, must “be universal, in the sense that it must dis-
criminate the necessary from the contingent features of life, selecting just the 
former” (ibid., p. 6). 
 The result of these three shifts, the experimental and its two conceptual 
consequences, is a central conflict surrounding the question of the origin of 
life: can protocells synthesized in the laboratory tell us anything about how 
life on Earth actually came into being? Is the question of how life actually 
came into being even an answerable question or is it doomed to remain in-
conclusive? While the first worry would be expressed by more traditionally-
minded researchers, the second is characteristic of a new generation of syn-
thetic biologists.  
 Such a divergence was present in the first workshops in 2003, which 
“started with some tension between the origin of life perspective and the 
more general concern with synthesizing the simplest possible artificial cells” 
(Rasmussen et al. 2004, p. 965). A similar doubletalk is present in more re-
cent papers, arguing on the one hand that synthesizing protocells “will deep-
en our understanding of the essence of cellular life and its origin on Earth” 
while at the same time acknowledging that “solutions found in the laboratory 
need not be chemically similar or even directly relevant to the actual molecu-
lar assemblies that led to the origin of life on Earth” (Szostak, Bartel & Luisi 
2001, p. 387). 
 What we see at work is a struggle over what the origin of life research 
should actually be about: is its object actual or possible biology? For those 
who are interested in how life actually came into being on Earth, laboratory 
syntheses are deemed irrelevant: 
There are no agreed upon prebiotic conditions to begin with nor is it obvious 
which molecular building blocks were and were not available. […]. Perhaps 
most frustratingly, we may not be able to recognize success if a laboratory 
made protocellular system were constructed that faithfully mimicked Earth’s 
first cells. [Del Bianco & Mansy 2012, p. 2125] 
The question always remains, in the words of Steven Benner (2012, p. xvi): 
“Did life emerge on Earth in this way?” But Benner favors the alternative 
perspective. After listing a whole range of similar problems, he adds that we 
should “attempt to resolve these problems by ignoring them, accepting (per-
haps arbitrarily) the chemist’s question (How might life have originated?), its 
approach to answer the question, and the standards of proof that chemists 
accept” (Benner 2012, p. xvi). Let me explore what this means by focusing on 
the work of Stephen Mann and Pier Luigi Luisi. 
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4.1 Stephen Mann and universal biology 
Stephen Mann describes his own work as ‘protobiology’ or ‘protolife science’ 
(Dzieciol & Mann 2011, p. 80; Mann 2013, p. 155). He defines this field as 
“the search for the minimal organizational logic that is sufficient for the 
emergence of matter with a basic level of systems autonomy, ultimately capa-
ble of undergoing evolutionary change” (Mann 2013, p. 159). The work of 
Mann and his group consists in the chemical exploration of protocells in the 
laboratory, testing which particular properties of life can be reproduced and 
mimicked in a chemical way. Life is seen through a formal lens, namely as “as 
a systems property that is maintained under non-equilibrium conditions by 
flows of energy and matter from the surrounding environment” (Dzieciol & 
Mann 2011, p. 80). Mann even goes so far as to argue that “the ultimate crite-
rion that defines life” could be found in a “form of organizational logic” 
which “has been described using various terms, such as autopoiesis (self-
production), autocatalytic self-maintaining metabolic networks, or metabolic 
closure” (ibid., p. 81). Such criteria are not limited to terrestrial biology, ra-
ther the ambition is to aim for a “framework for a universal biology that pen-
etrates deep into the history of life on the Earth” (Mann 2012, p. 2140). 
 These claims could bring forth the impression that this kind of research is 
unrelated to that which preoccupied Miller or Bernal. But Mann and his col-
leagues see their work as a continuation of this tradition, solving the prob-
lems that were left unanswered by their predecessors. Mann even starts one 
of his review studies with an overview of the current state of the art on the 
origin of life (Mann 2012), while the other opens with the claim that 
It is ironic that modern biology – considered by many to be the pre-eminent 
science of the 21st century – tells us everything we know about life as it exists 
today, but nothing substantial about its origin on the early Earth some 3.5-3.8 
billion years ago. [Mann 2013, p. 155] 
Moreover, he argues that “a study of biology offers no illumination on the 
origin of life – on how life first emerged in a physical universe” and that  
there remains an intractable discontinuity at the base of the reconstructed tree 
of life, where all current knowledge of biology becomes effectively bottle-
necked such that the origin of life appears impenetrable and mysterious. Met-
aphorically speaking, the tree of life appears rootless. [Mann 2013, p. 155] 
Although biologists cannot solve these problems, the tools to answer these 
questions reside in the hands of another group, namely the chemists, who 
must play a central role, “along with colleagues in synthetic biology, com-
plexity science and systems engineering” (ibid., p. 156). But through this ges-
ture, the problem of the origin of life has been redefined, since to find out 
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the exact processes by which life on Earth came into being is deemed impos-
sible: 
Thus, the irrevocable erasing of prebiotic signatures by Archean geochemistry, 
the fragmentary and rudimentary nature of models of the early Earth atmos-
phere and oceans, the sheer impossibility of reconstructing local chemical 
conditions, and the perceived weakness of the underlying theories are suffi-
cient reasons to halt a concerted chemical approach to solving the origin of 
life. (Ibid., p. 155) 
What was originally a historical question is transformed into an ahistorical 
one. Or, to put it in Mann’s own words, we are faced with “reframing an etio-
logical problem with an ontological one” (ibid., p. 156). 3 This implies “a shift 
away from ‘Stanley Miller-type’ experiments in which highly speculative sce-
narios of early Earth reaction conditions are probed, to more judicious and 
systematic investigations that are breaking new ground by attempting to 
solve old problems with new chemistries” (ibid.). Or to quote him more ex-
tensively: 
is it possible for life to emerge through fundamentally different organization-
al, operational and evolutionary mechanisms, or are the core criteria of terres-
trial biology – membrane-based cellularity, semi-conservative DNA/RNA-
mediated self-replication, protein-regulated metabolism, Darwinian evolution, 
non-equilibrium energization – invariant and axiomatic? This wider perspec-
tive necessitates an intellectual shift away from the historical impasse associated 
with the study of the origin of life specifically on Earth to a broader perspective 
concerned with the generic transformation of inanimate matter to a life-like 
state. And by focusing attention towards the possibility of generating alterna-
tive models of life in the laboratory that are essentially devoid of historical con-
tent – that is, without needing to anticipate too many unknown boundary 
conditions – it should be possible for chemists to contribute significantly to 
understanding the origin of life as a general physical phenomenon, even if the 
actual origin of life as it occurred on the early Earth remains unresolved. [Ibid., 
emphasis added] 
We are thus confronted with a redefinition of the question of the origin of 
life in function of the new experimental and synthetic possibilities in the lab. 
The question is not anymore how life factually came into being on Earth, but 
rather the question of the underlying principles of the possibility for life. 
Synthetic biology aims for a universal biology.  
 The notion of universal biology, however, is ambiguous and needs clarifi-
cation. There have been several different varieties of universal biology. None-
theless, they have something in common: “universal biology is the multidisci-
plinary study of the noncontingent properties of life as guided by biological theory 
and constrained by the universe.” (Mariscal & Fleming 2017, p. 122) But to 
clarify this further, Mariscal & Fleming (2017) distinguish three programs, 
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which I will name ontological, epistemological, and methodological universal 
biology. 
 Ontological universal biology concerns the universal aspects of its object 
of study, life. It is interested in finding features common to all forms of life, 
regardless whether they exist in the universe or are yet to be actualized. 
Mariscal & Fleming (2017) give the example of Craig Venter’s work on the 
creation of novel artificial minimal cells (see Simons 2020b). Epistemological 
universal biology rather concerns the universal aspects of the science, biology: 
biological theories or laws that are universally applicable. Examples are uni-
versal Darwinism, claiming that all living systems in the universe obey Dar-
winian principles of evolution (Dawkins 1982), or Kauffman’s substrate-
neutral understanding of biology based on complexity theory and self-
organization (Kauffman 2000). Finally, methodological universal biology con-
cerns the universal applicability of biological concepts outside of biology 
proper, e.g., to investigate the structure of the universe at large. Mariscal & 
Fleming (2017) give the example of Dan McShea’s work on teleology as a 
product of the structural hierarchy in a system, which McShea (2012) himself 
had applied both to biology and the formation of solar systems. 
 Protocell biology seems to fall under the first group, where universal bi-
ology is understood as aiming to articulate and explore the physico-chemical 
properties of any life whatsoever. The particular contingencies of terrestrial 
life are left aside. Such a universal biology redistributes the experimental 
landscape. Whereas previously the relevance of formal and artificial biological 
systems in the life sciences could be questioned, since any connection be-
tween the proposed model and life on Earth could be contested, this kind of 
criticism becomes irrelevant. No matter what one creates in the lab, it is an 
instantiation of the universal biology and therefore relevant. In that sense, 
protocell biology differs from Koskinen’s (2017) take on synthetic biologists 
as aiming for how-possibly explanations. Both differ from historical explana-
tions of life (how it actually happened), but how-possibly explanations (how 
it could have happened otherwise) also differ from how-universally explana-
tions (which we take would hold true for all life everywhere) (see Scharf et al. 
2015). The latter two become central in synthetic biology, though they might 
not always perfectly align with one another. 
4.2 Luisi and the question of contingency 
I wish to explore another dimension of protocell biology through the work 
of the Luisi group, namely in what way protocell biologists study possibili-
ties. Pier Luigi Luisi describes himself as “a chemist who left his original ave-
nues of polymer chemistry to move towards biochemistry and biology” (Lui-
si 2007, p. 603). He considers his own work as “chemical synthetic biology” 
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(ibid., p. 604) and is mainly concerned with the question of the origin of life, 
or ‘the emergence of life’ as Luisi calls it. His starting point is, “the percep-
tion of a shift in the field of the origin of life, a new ‘Zeitgeist’” (Luisi 2006, 
p. xi).  
 In what does this new Zeitgeist consist? Mainly in a number of shifts in 
techniques and instruments in biochemistry, going back to the 1990s, such as 
“the discovery of the self-reproduction of micelles and vesicles” (Stano & 
Luisi 2010, p. 3639). Micelles and vesicles are molecular structures that auto-
matically form a membrane, typically through a contrast between hydrophilic 
and hydrophobic parts. While protocells remained theoretical entities for a 
long period, structures such as liposomes (spherical vesicles) gave these enti-
ties a concrete translation in chemical entities which chemists and biologists 
could articulate and interrogate in the laboratory. Or, in the words of Luisi, 
“one additional reason for this rise of interest lies in a diffused sense of con-
fidence that the minimal cell is indeed an experimentally accessible target” 
(Luisi, Ferri & Stano 2006, p. 12). 
 Luisi speaks of ‘minimal cells’ rather than ‘protocells’. There is a slight but 
important difference between both notions. While ‘protocells’ refer to life-
like biochemical entities that possess some, but not all, properties of a living 
cell, ‘minimal cells’ are rather “defined as a system that has minimal and suffi-
cient structural conditions for life” (Luisi 2002, p. 209). Luisi describes his 
own approach as a “semi-synthetic approach to minimal cells” which “in-
volves the use of extant genes and proteins in order to build a supramolecular 
construct based on lipid vesicles” (Luisi 2007, p. 605). He thus synthesizes a 
cell chemically, namely the vesicle, but adds parts of living cells, such as ribo-
somes, to these vesicles. 
 But what are the questions Luisi is trying to address by studying minimal 
cells? In short, his reply is the following: 
It may bring an answer to the questions of whether life is possible with less 
complexity, whether life is indeed an emergent property arising from the non-
living, whether in the history of cell evolution final living cells had indeed as 
precursors ‘limping’ half-living cells […]. Even if we are not able to explain 
how life originated on Earth, we may be able to give a good answer to such 
questions. [Luisi 2006, p. 270] 
This passage must be unpacked because three things are at stake. A first fac-
tor is that of complexity. Minimal cells are interesting and relevant because, 
contrasted with natural cells, they illuminate “the question of whether or not 
such complexity [of natural cells] is really essential for life, or whether or not 
cellular life might be possible with a much smaller number of components” 
(Luisi, Ferri & Stano 2006, p. 1). Minimal cells provide a way to go beyond 
the evolutionary contingencies of cells to the central properties of life. The 
goal is thus to falsify a necessity: certain properties are necessary for life. Re-
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moving these forms highlights how these complexities are contingent and 
not necessary.  
 Secondly, there is the question of the emergence of life: how does living 
material emerge out of non-living material? This comes close to what was the 
central question for Oparin and Miller. Luisi does refer favorably to both of 
them. “However, the main hypothesis, that cellular life derives from inani-
mate matter, has not been demonstrated yet. It must then be considered still 
a working hypothesis.” (Luisi 2006, p. 268) He is thus interested in showing 
how chemically “life developed by itself – without any transcendental help” 
(Luisi 2002, p. 208). Here the goal seems to be a confirmation of a possibility. 
 And thirdly, “the general question ‘theoretically, how much can the struc-
ture of modern cells be simplified?’ is related to the question about the struc-
ture of the early cells” (Luisi 2007, p. 610). This brings us back to the ques-
tion of the origin of life. But Luisi has redefined what kind of phenomena are 
at stake here. In an editorial, Luisi describes how his own bottom-up ap-
proach is of crucial importance,  
in those fields of enquiry where the ‘object’ of the investigation is not availa-
ble. This is the field of origin of life, where all intermediate steps leading to the 
evolution of early macromolecules, metabolic networks, primitive cells are 
largely unknown and cannot be studied classically. Bottom-up approaches al-
low us to probe, certainly in a minimal way, the huge field of reactions, paths, 
and structures that were potentially viable when life evolved on Earth, and 
possibly understand what have been the most important milestones in molecu-
lar and protocellular evolution. [Luisi, Chiarabelli, & Stano 2014, p. 6] 
The aim is not to offer a historical explanation of the origins of life, since that 
is deemed impossible, because “the sequence of our macromolecules of life – 
enzymes, RNA, and DNA – are the products of the vagaries of contingency 
and by definition it is then impossible to reproduce them in the laboratory” 
(Luisi 2006, p. 268). Similar to Mann, life is rather defined through a number 
of formal criteria, unconnected to terrestrial biology: “self-maintenance (me-
tabolism), self-reproduction, and evolvability” (Luisi 2007, p. 610). The “uni-
versality of the living” can best be grasped through “the theory of autopoie-
sis” (Lucantoni & Luisi 2012, p. 385). 
 Luisi frames this through the opposition between determinism and con-
tingentism: “why has a certain type of molecular form been selected in the 
construction of life – and not another?” (Luisi 2006, p. 13) The determinist 
claims that the chemistry of terrestrial life is necessary and could not have 
been otherwise; all life requires it. This was the (implicit) position of some-
one like Bernal. The contingentist, however, argues that terrestrial biology is 
based on chemical contingencies and that a universal biology is not bound to 
it. Luisi considers himself part of the second group, and questions any form 
of determinism: “it would only make sense if the construction of life was 
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demonstrably a preferential, highly probable natural pathway: but this is pre-
cisely what we do not know” (ibid., p. 6). Once again the question thus be-
comes one of a falsification of a necessity. The goal, however, is a universal 
biology: by trying to show the contingency of properties of life, synthetic 
biologist will end up with a list of properties that resist such ‘falsifications’, 
i.e. the universal properties of life. 
 More concretely, this way of framing the question of the origin of life is 
at work in Luisi’s project on Never-Born Proteins (NBPs). The starting 
point is the idea that  
the proteins existing in nature are only an infinitesimal part of the possible 
polypeptide sequences […]. One might say, for example, that the ratio be-
tween the possible and the actual protein sequences corresponds, in order of 
magnitude, to the ratio between the size of the universe and the size of a single 
hydrogen atom […]. As trivial and old as it is, this consideration elicits some 
interesting questions about the origin of life, one of which being why and how 
these “few” extant proteins were selected during evolution. [Luisi 2007, p. 
606] 
The determinist would argue that the proteins used by terrestrial biology are 
the only viable ones, due to some as yet undefined special properties. The 
contingentist, however, would argue that other options were available, but 
that only the current chemical pathways were chosen through a historical 
accident. Luisi interestingly adds that “[o]f course we have many still un-
known proteins on Earth, but clearly the question of the non-selected NBPs 
has quite a different flavour” (ibid., p. 606-607). The question thus concerns 
unknown possibilities rather than unknown actualities. 
 What Luisi actually did in his experiments was to explore the realms of 
NBPs through the phage-display method: you synthesize the DNA parts 
that would express NBPs and put the DNA in bacteriophages. Subsequently 
you let the phages infect living cells in order to force the machinery of the 
cell to express these novel proteins. You thus end up with NBPs of which 
you could study the specific properties.4 What Luisi was interested in was 
especially the folding of proteins: do terrestrial proteins fold differently than 
NBPs? If they do, this might corroborate the determinist position. However, 
Luisi’s results suggest that the proteins used by terrestrial biology are not 
special and do not seem to stand out in the larger realm of NBPs. Therefore, 
the data “permit to break a lance in favor of the scenario of contingency” 
(ibid., p. 607). 
 But a second conclusion is also present: “If ‘our’ proteins are the product 
of contingency, then with all probability, the pathway to their prebiotic syn-
thesis cannot be reproduced in the laboratory” (ibid., p. 608). If the chemis-
try of our terrestrial biology is contingent, this is seen as a disqualifying fac-
tor. Its origin is no longer deemed to be an object of genuine scientific study. 
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Such contingencies could not be reproduced in the laboratory, at least not in 
a systematic and reproducible way (since each iteration would result in dif-
ferent proteins). Does this then mean the end of the origin of life research? 
Are we reaching the borders of science, a historical science which possesses 
neither laws nor data? Surprisingly the answer is no. Synthetic biologists can 
continue their work, if only they shift towards another question, that of ex-
ploring possible ways in which life could come into being, aiming for a uni-
versal biology: 
the synthesis of exactly ‘our’ proteins on Earth is doomed by contingency – 
we cannot hope to find out the exact conditions that determined the final se-
quence of a given protein or a nucleic acid from our Earth. Once this bitter as-
sertion is accepted, we should at least attempt experiments that show that the 
prebiotic synthesis of some specific sequence in many identical copies is possi-
ble. [Luisi 2006, p. 82] 
4.3 Experimental systems for modal properties 
This new generation of synthetic biologists thus engage with the old histori-
cal question of the origin of life, but in a radically different manner. The dif-
ference resides not so much in a radically different theory. Rather, what has 
shifted is the realm of phenomena deemed relevant to be studied. For Miller 
or Bernal it was about articulating the actual historical origin of life on Earth. 
For authors like Mann or Luisi it is about the possible origin of life. 
 As stated in the introduction, the strong claim I wish to defend is that to 
understand this shift in regimes of articulation, a shift in experimental prac-
tices is important, related to the possibility to synthesize. As was illustrated 
with the case of Luisi in particular, the technical possibilities to synthesize 
and manipulate vesicles allowed for a transformation of proto- and minimal 
cells from theoretical to experimental entities. They became “an experimen-
tally accessible target” (Luisi, Ferri & Stano 2006, p. 12). Luisi even gives a 
brief history of this novel experimental object and how minimal cells only 
recently became something more than pure theory: 
The story of the minimal cell on the basis of liposomes started in the early 
1990s mostly in my laboratory at the ETH Zürich, where we set up methods 
to perform complex molecular biology reactions inside liposomes, for example 
the polymerase chain reaction [ref], or the incorporation of the entire ribo-
some machinery inside liposomes with the production of the first polypeptide 
chain [ref]. I believe the term ‘minimal cell’, related to the synthetic biology 
using liposomes, appeared in that 1995 paper with Oberholzer [ref]. [Luisi 
2006, p. v] 
Or, to put it philosophically, protocells became a new accessible ‘epistemic 
thing’ (Rheinberger 1997). Following Rheinberger, epistemic things come 
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with a novel experimental system, resulting in transformations of the relevant 
techniques and questions as well. What enabled the shift in synthetic biology 
from actualities to possibilities is thus these new experimentally accessible 
cell-like systems that can be synthesized, transformed, and analyzed in labor-
atories. Through them questions about biological possibilities, which were in 
the past dismissed as irrelevant or purely speculative, are translated into 
meaningful experimental questions that can be readily answered through the 
novel synthetic methods. 
 What kind of modal properties can be studied through this new experi-
mental system? There are several options. First of all, there is the option of a 
falsification of a necessity. This new method of synthesis allows biologists to 
show experimentally that a property of life is not necessary, that it could be 
otherwise. Synthetic biologists can be interested in this for several reasons: 
either it shows how the existing theories are inadequate, since they assume its 
necessity; or, if it cannot be falsified, it brings them a step closer to finding 
the universal properties of life. Secondly, there is the confirmation of a possi-
bility: showing that something that we thought was impossible, or never 
thought about, is nonetheless possible. This could be interpreted along 
Koskinen’s examples of how-possibly models. In more recent work, 
Koskinen has explored this theme further through a number of themes from 
philosophy of science. First of all, there is the multiple realizability thesis 
(Koskinen 2018). The work of synthetic biologists could then be interpreted 
as the exploration of how the same biological function could be realized 
through different means: either the natural way or its artificially designed 
counterpart. This is applicable to origins of life research as well, mainly if it is 
occupied with studying alternative origins of life. 
 Secondly, in a more recent paper Knuuttila and Koskinen (2020) suggest 
the useful notion of semifactuality: what synthetic biologists are interested in 
is not just ‘what-if-things-were-different’ questions (counterfactuals), but 
often also ‘even-if-things-were-different’ questions (semifactuals). They want 
to know whether something that is true in the actual world is also true in 
slightly different possible worlds, e.g. whether DNA and XNA can have the 
same function or, as in the case of Luisi, whether the proteins used by life 
would be the same in slightly different worlds. The new experimental system 
of synthetic biologists enables them to translate these questions about modal 
properties into questions that can be experimentally pursued. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this article, I have argued through the case of research in the origin of life 
how synthetic biology can be characterized by a shift in its regime of articula-
tion, from one focusing on the actual and contingent terrestrial biology to-
wards one focused on a universal biology. The questions of the origins of life 
thus shifts from ‘what has happened?’ to the question ‘what has possibly 
happened?’. Let me reiterate that my claim is not that the old historical ques-
tion of the origins of life was completely abandoned. There are still biologists 
trying to answer this question. My claim is rather that the question of a uni-
versal biology has become more dominant in synthetic biology. 
 Such a shift from actuality to possibility can also be seen at work in other 
projects in synthetic biology, such as xenobiology (Koskinen 2017) and syn-
thetic genomics (Simons 200b). Nonetheless, what protocell biology brings 
to the table is the link with debates on universal biology and behind ques-
tions about ‘what has possibly happened?’ questions concerned ‘what has 
necessary happened?’ or ‘what has universally happened?’ are at work. 
 Moreover, I have tried to argue that the reason for this shift towards bio-
logical possibilities is not just a matter of biologists having reached a point 
where they understand terrestrial biology and now subsequently want to 
know what is universal. As critics of universal biology have noted before, the 
things we do not understand about terrestrial biology are still nearly limitless 
(e.g. Sterelny 1997). So why then focus on universal elements? The hypothe-
sis that I defended is that the answer is a shift in its experimental system 
(Rheinberger 1997): new accessible targets such as vesicles, combined with 
stronger synthetic methods, made these questions about biological possibili-
ties experimentally meaningful. Similarly, the prediction is that in other syn-
thetic biology projects the main reason for this shift is related to shifts in 
experimental systems as well, mainly the rise of genomics which is linked 
with the increase in use of computers and big data sets (see Stevens 2013, Le-
onelli 2016). 
 To end, let me briefly highlight two further avenues of research to which 
this hypothesis give rise. First of all, this perspective allows us to better un-
derstand the somewhat strange alliance within synthetic biology between of-
ten practically-minded engineers and theory-minded chemists such as Mann 
or Luisi. Synthetic biology is sometimes seen as split between these two 
groups, often with the result that most attention is paid to the engineers at 
the expense of the chemists. My hypothesis, however, allows us to see how 
both groups can actually be aligned, since both see it as their task to explore 
biological possibilities. 
 Secondly, this perspective also enables us to situate synthetic biology 
within the broader technoscientific wave (Schmidt 2015, Simons 2021b). 
112 Massimiliano Simons 
 
Many technosciences can be characterized by an interest in exploring possi-
bilities, often without a concrete interest to go beyond a mere proof-of-
principle (Bensaude-Vincent & Loeve 2018). Nanotechnologists are interest-
ed in what nanomaterials can do; roboticists are interested in what robots are 
capable of. Similar to synthetic biologists they smoothly combine an interest 
in fundamental research and practical applications. Focusing on the shift in 
its regime of articulation enables us therefore to understand what is specific 




1 Schmidt proposes his own candidate, namely late modern technologies which aim 
for “the idea(l) of harnessing self-organization for engineering purposes” 
(Schmidt 2015, p. 1). Although I do not disagree with this candidate, I wish to 
supplement it with an analysis of synthetic biology that highlights not only how 
its object, but also its ambitions and methods have changed. 
2 An important factor here is the broader political context of the USSR. Oparin’s 
view is influenced by a form of ‘dialectical materialism’. Oparin claims that “Dia-
lectical materialism makes it possible to accept the material basis of life without 
having to regard every phenomenon not included in physics and chemistry as vi-
talistic or supernatural” (Oparin 1961, p. 5). It has been noted “that many of those 
who contributed to the early-20th century philosophical breakthrough in the 
study of the origin of life were Marxists: notably Oparin, Haldane, the virologist 
N.W. Pirie and the English physical chemist J.D. Bernal” (Fry 2005, p. 27). This 
seems to be an instance where political ideology played a positive and productive 
role for scientific research. 
3 In a more recent paper, the group of Dieter Braun speaks of a choice between an 
“archaeological approach” and a “synthetic approach,” opting for the latter since 
“the laws of physics and chemistry are universal. Hence, if a synthesis pathway is 
discovered that, e.g., nucleotides can be synthesized in high yield and purity using 
a limited set of conditions, the same set of conditions would have produced the 
same result at the emergence of life.” The old question, “the historical Origin of 
Life question, i.e., how exactly life on Earth emerged, will remain hidden and 
speculative” (Agerschou, Mast & Braun 2017, pp. 61-62). 
4 In addition, they added the tripeptide PRG in the DNA strands in order to pre-
vent the enzymes of the cells from digesting the NBPs. They also looked at ‘nev-
er-born’ messenger RNAs, which in properties seem not that different from the 
actual m-RNAs terrestrial biology uses. 
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